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This article focuses on a scientific approach to the study of cognition that Warren
McCulloch introduced in the era of cybernetics as “experimental epistemology.” In
line with recent attempts to highlight its contribution to cognitive science and AI, our
article intends to draw attention to its unexplored influence on contemporary embodied
approaches to the investigation of mind and consciousness. To this end, we will
survey a series of models of cognitive systems genealogically related to the McCulloch-
Pitts networks-based modeling approach, i.e., von Foerster’s model of the biological
computer, the Maturana-Varela model of the autopoietic system, and Varela’s model of
emergent selves. Based on examination of the relevant aspects of these models, we
will argue that they offered the McCulloch-Pitts “cybernetic of networks” a coherent
methodological and theoretical line of development, complementary to the well-known
computationalist one. As we will show, this alternative evolutionary line empowered
the biological orientation of McCulloch’s experimental epistemology, laying foundations
for contemporary “radically embodied” approaches to mind and consciousness – in
particular the Thompson-Varela approach. We will identify the heritage of this tradition
of inquiry for future research in cognitive science and AI by proposing guidelines
that synthetize how its methodological and theoretical insights suggest taking into
account the role(s) played by the biological body in cognitive processes – consciousness
included.
Keywords: autonomy, autopoiesis, constructivism, cybernetics of networks, (radical) embodiment, enaction,
experimental epistemology, synthetic modeling
INTRODUCTION
“Experimental epistemology” is the designation given to one of the most original scientific projects
in the era of cybernetics. Neurophysiologist Warren McCulloch, the project’s creator, introduced
this label to differentiate his undertaking from other contemporary scientific approaches
to the study of cognition. McCulloch’s approach emphasized merging neurophysiological
and philosophical research, specifically by employing a rigorous “experimental” approach in
neurophysiology to revisit the questions traditionally asked by philosophy of knowledge – i.e.,
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“epistemology” in the classical sense. In concrete terms, this
meant focusing the scientific inquiry on complex dimensions and
properties of thought, as defined by philosophical investigations,
and explaining them in terms of plausible neurophysiological
mechanisms, based on experimental research.
Beginning in the 1940s, McCulloch used these programmatic
bases to develop experimental epistemology as a trans-
disciplinary science of mind focusing on studying, as legitimate
objects of experimental and quantitative research, all mental
processes – consciousness included.
The methodological approach was genuinely cybernetic.
McCulloch recognized that traditional analytic procedures are
indispensable to accessing anatomical and neurophysiological
structures of the brain, but that they cannot appropriately
support the exploration of its functions. Understanding how
the brain generates cognitive processes requires studying its
mechanisms in operation, which demands a research method
centered not on analysis, but on synthesis. With other
pioneers of cybernetics, McCulloch saw this new methodological
approach in the “synthetic method” emerging from the proto-
cybernetic movements of the beginning of the 20th century
(Cordeschi, 2002). Like other cyberneticists, he interpreted it as
complementing the traditional analytical method (Craik, 1943),
and implemented it along the lines of the “understanding by
building” methodological slogan that, still today, guides frontier
research in AI and the other sciences of the artificial (Pfeifer
and Scheier, 1999; Damiano and Stano, 2018a,b). In short, the
core idea is to seek the mechanisms underlying natural complex
processes through scientifically informed attempts to artificially
re-create those processes. In the case of the synthetic study of
mental processes, this means elaborating theoretical hypotheses
on how the brain might generate the target processes, detailing
the hypotheses in terms of plausible mechanisms, and testing
the hypotheses by embodying these mechanisms in (possible or
actual) artifacts apt to produce the target processes.
McCulloch’s work in experimental epistemology was
groundbreaking. As recent attempts to highlight its contribution
to science show, his approach to the modeling of brain activity,
developed with Walter Pitts in terms of networks of idealized
neurons, has served as scaffolding for some of the most generative
fields of contemporary science – cognitive science, AI, computer
science, neuroscience and neural nets, among others (e.g., Kay,
2001; Dupuy, 2009).
Drawing on these lines, our article intends to contribute
to illuminating the influence that McCulloch’s experimental
epistemology has had, and still can have, on scientific research on
mind and consciousness. Yet, unlike the most widely published
readings of the relevance of McCulloch’s work in this field, we
will not concentrate on its impact on computationalist, that is,
classical cognitive science and AI. Instead, we will bring into
focus another line of development of McCulloch’s experimental
epistemology, usually neglected despite its influence on the
emergence of embodied cognitive science – in particular, its
radical lines.
Starting in the 1950s, McCulloch’s work contributed to the
rise to a set of interconnected research lines – i.e., second order
cybernetics, autopoietic biology, Varelian enaction – engaged in
proposing an alternative to computationalism. As we will show,
these strands have genealogical, theoretical and methodological
connections with McCulloch’s line of inquiry, and share a series
of elements uniting them in a coherent research tradition – the
tradition of experimental epistemology. In fact, the proponents
of these research approaches defined their investigations
through the notion of epistemology – sometimes “experimental
epistemology” (Maturana, 1974; Varela, 1986). Aligning with
McCulloch’s approach, they combined neurophysiological and
philosophical research, as well as the analytic and synthetic
methods. Furthermore, they used this approach to rework
McCulloch’s modeling of cognitive systems in terms of networks,
based on a principle of continuity between life and cognition.
This produced a progression of models that, redrawing the
McCulloch-Pitts networks based on biological insights, generated
early, radically embodied approaches to the study of mind and
consciousness.
This article intends to reconstruct and analyze the main
phases of this unexplored line of development of experimental
epistemology, and define guidelines that, according to its
radicalization of McCulloch’s idea of “embodiments of mind,” can
spur contemporary embodied cognitive science on to look for
non-trivial accounts of the role(s) played by the biological body
in cognition.
TWO CO-EMERGING PARADIGMS
The McCulloch-Pitts Cybernetics of
Networks
When McCulloch introduced the label “experimental
epistemology,” he intended to designate a research tradition to
which he considered he belonged. One of the last representatives
of this tradition, which McCulloch dated back to physiologist
Rudolph Magnus, was Dusser de Barenne, who was McCulloch’s
guide in neurophysiological inquiry during the second half of
the 1930s (McCulloch, 1961a,b). From de Barenne, McCulloch
inherited the postulate of the primacy of the “physiological
a priori,” conceived of in terms of a Kantian synthetic a priori
hard-wired in the nervous system. Based on this idea, McCulloch
worked with de Barenne’s group on mapping circuit action in the
brain. The resulting wiring diagrams led him to a key hypothesis:
from perception to consciousness, all cognitive processes are
generated by neuronal impulses moving on brain-pathways.
This thesis is the core of the McCulloch-Pitts synthetic
approach to modeling brain activity. In the late 1930s, based
on Alan Turing’s studies on machine intelligence and Claude
Shannon’s application of Boolean algebra to electric circuits,
McCulloch began building the basic theoretical image of this
approach. Neurons can be characterized as computational units
that define their “all-or-none” – 0 or 1 – state by performing logic
calculations on the 0/1 signals received from the other neurons,
and, through these operations, neuronal activity generates, in
the brain-pathways, flowing sequences of 0 and 1 s, which are
constitutive of all mental processes.
In 1941, McCulloch, with Pitts, started transforming this
picture into a model describing how the brain might do logic
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processing neuro-biologically. The resulting article – A logical
calculus of ideas immanent in nervous activity (McCulloch and
Pitts’, 1943) – can be read as follows. Shannon demonstrated the
possibility of digital computing machines, showing how Boolean
functions can be implemented in electric circuits. McCulloch and
Pitts, by drawing artificial networks of neurons, demonstrated
that the brain can be conceived of as a machine of this kind – a
Turing machine. Indeed, according to the 1943 McCulloch-Pitts
modeling, neurons are functional units analogous to Boolean
logic operators (AND, OR, etc.), and compute their states by
applying the rules of Boolean logic to their input signals. When
these “compute-and-fire” units are interconnected in networks,
they are able to implement complex Boolean functions. Related
computation activity generates the logic propositions that are
constitutive of mental life – perception, ideas, purposes, etc.
The McCulloch and Pitts’ approach had major consequences.
From the scientific point of view, the most general was that all
mental process – from perception to learning, from reasoning to
consciousness – could be conceived of in terms of mechanisms.
The McCulloch-Pitts networks released mind from the “ghostly”
status it had assumed in physiology, and reintegrated it among
the objects of experimental and quantitative investigation.
Indeed, from a philosophical point of view, what McCulloch and
Pitts were proposing was a viable alternative to the res cogitans
postulated by René Descartes. They were modeling mind not
as a substance, but as a process. More specifically, mind was
an intrinsically dynamic and collective entity, “immanent” in –
distributed in or emerging from – the computational activity of
a population of neurons. Mind, instead of being a “ghost in the
[cerebral] machine” (Ryle, 1949), was the functioning machine
itself, that is, a logic machine realized as a network of binary
operations of Boolean computation.
The main thesis of the 1943 article, conveyed in McCulloch’s
expression “embodiments of mind,” was this: All mental life is
immanent in the computational activity of networks of neurons.
Consciousness – like other cognitive processes – is computational
processing performed by neuronal networks and has to be
understood computationally.
In the evolution of the nascent cognitive science and
AI, this thesis played a crucial role, grounding at least two
influential research paradigms. Chronologically, the first was the
computationalist paradigm, which strengthened the McCulloch-
Pitts approach’s connection to traditional theory of knowledge.
The second was the constructivist paradigm, which reinforced its
connection to biology.
Mind as an Input–Output Machine.
Toward Computationalism
In McCulloch and Pitts’ (1943) article, the description of
the brain as a computational device was proposed in the
form of an equivalence theorem that identified McCulloch-
Pitts networks with universal calculators. Indeed, in this work,
artificial networks were characterized as systems that, like Turing
machines, transform inputs into outputs based on classical
propositional logic laws. The main point of the McCulloch-Pitts
theorem was that, “with a proper circuit,” the networks “could
compute any computable number, and hence could reach any
conclusion given by a finite set of premises [. . .]” (McCulloch,
1965).
Almost immediately, this thesis attracted the interest of
specialists working on the foundations of computer science. The
1943 McCulloch–Pitts synthetic model of neuronal activity was
included among the official theoretical sources of the functional
analogy between brain and computer that, starting in 1946,
progressively grounded the nascent computationalist cognitive
science and AI. Nearly a decade later, the related research
paradigm described cognitive processes in approximately this
way: The brain receives information through its senses, which
work as input devices. It processes the information through
neuronal operations, consisting of computations operated on the
syntactic aspect of physical symbols. Through these operations,
the brain produces internal representations of the outside world,
and generates plans of effective actions as motor system outputs.
Although it clearly converged with this theoretical landscape,
the McCulloch and Pitts’ (1943) proposal did not completely fit
into it. Two aspects of this theory were left out.
The first was the assertion of the reticular character of the
functional organization of the brain. Computationalism was
univocally focusing on a linear cognitive organization – ‘input-
processing-output.’ While approving of this view, McCulloch and
Pitts connected it to the idea of the reticularity of the brain – a
thesis inherent to their use of networks for modeling neuronal
activity.
The second aspect of the 1943 McCulloch-Pitts article
left out by computationalism was its thematization of mind.
McCulloch and Pitts developed it along two of the main axes
of traditional theory of knowledge: rationalism, evident in their
interpretation of cognition in terms of logical computation,
and representationalism, explicit in the idea of the intentionality
of “psychic events,” due to their “inherently propositional”
character. Despite this, the two cyberneticians, through their
thesis of the immanence of mind in brain activity, were refusing
the third pillar of classical theory of knowledge – i.e., the
substance dualism of body and mind. Computationalism, in
contrast, progressively reconstituted this dualism based on the
characterization of the brain/mind relation in terms of the
differentiation between computer hardware and software. In
the late 1960s, this distinction was radicalized in a dichotomy
through the “multiple realizability” thesis, according to which
a single mental kind (a mental property, state, or event) can
be realized in different physical kinds in such a way that it is
essentially independent and unconstrained by the specificities
of its materialization. This entailed that the computational
mind could be seen as an inherently immaterial logic machine,
functioning independently of the specifics of brain and body. In
other words, mind could be regarded as software that runs equally
well on brains and on other forms of hardware. Consequently,
its exploration could be independent from the study of brain
and body – a view that is incompatible with the methodological
positioning of McCulloch’s experimental epistemology.
These two elements of the 1943 McCulloch-Pitts proposal –
reticularity and immanence – can be recognized as two key
elements of the constructivist paradigm inspired by this work.
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As its label suggests, this research paradigm stands as an
alternative to computationalism. Constructivism rejects the
traditional characterization of cognition as a representation of
an independent reality, and qualifies it as an adaptive function
through which living systems actively organize – construct – their
world of reference (Ceruti, 1987, 2007; von Glasersfeld, 1995;
Damiano, 2009).1
Scaffolding for a Cybernetics of
Autonomy
A few years after the publication of the 1943 article, McCulloch
started to recognize the limitations of the approach. He did
not simply point out that biological neurons, unlike McCulloch-
Pitts neurons, can compute different Boolean functions, and
work not only in series, but also in parallel. He further argued
that the biological brain does not include networks like the
McCulloch-Pitts ones – that is, networks structured to compute
a specific Boolean function. According to him, this was because
genes cannot specify the wiring of the brain, which implies that
the majority of neuronal connections have to be generated by
learning during interactions with the environment.
As we have 1010 neurons, we can inherit only the general scheme
of the structure of our brains. The rest must be left to chance.
Chance includes experience which engenders learning [. . . as
. . .] the growing of new connections. [. . .] Why is the mind in
the head? Because there, and only there, are hosts of possible
connections to be formed as time and circumstance demand.
(McCulloch, 1951, pp. 85–86)
For McCulloch, this consideration expressed the need for
a methodological change in his synthetic modeling approach.
Instead of choosing a cognitive function and then defining the
structure of a network able to realize it, the modeling had
to start from networks based on random connections among
artificial neurons and attempt to determine what properties and
functions the networks were able to develop in interaction with
an environment.
At the theoretical level, this focalization on “chance” expressed
the thesis that brain connections are not exogenously determined
either. Unlike a computer, the brain is not a heteronomous system
built and instructed by an external constructor. The brain is
an autonomous system that determines itself through a self-
organization dynamic taking place within the twofold ecology of
body and environment. The way to explore the brain in action
experimentally, through the synthetic approach, had to entail
bringing into the experimental scene the brain’s own activity of
self-organization during interaction processes.
McCulloch and Pitts started to implement this change of
perspective in studies exploring neurophysiological mechanisms
underlying pattern recognition. The 1947 article presenting
this work – How We Know Universals (Pitts and McCulloch,
1947) – offered new perspectives not only in histology, anatomy,
and physiology (Kay, 2001), but also in synthetic modeling of
1With our definition, and the following analysis of experimental epistemology’s
constructivist developments, we refer in particular to the strand of constructivism
that Alexander Riegler calls “biological constructivism” (Riegler, 2012).
brain activity. The novel approach was based on probabilistic
Boolean networks, whose design took into account instability
and indeterminacy of neuronal dynamics. The networks were
articulated on layers of populations of neurons that computed
in sets. The focus was not on the logic performances of the
networks, but on the cognitive function of perception that they
were modeling – the interaction between the networks and their
environments.
This series of shifts in the McCulloch-Pitts cybernetics
of networks – from problem solving to learning, from
serial to parallel computation, from input-output to reticular
organization, from digital computers to situated biological-like
systems – promoted the rise of the constructivist paradigm.
Networks as Biological Computers.
Toward Constructivism
One of the earliest protagonists of this development was
Heinz von Foerster, a member of McCulloch’s team at Illinois
University. In the late 1950s, he founded a new laboratory
there: the Biological Computer Laboratory – BCL (Müller
and Müller, 2007). Its main assignment was to use artificial
networks to conduct synthetic explorations of cognition able
to account for the autonomy of biological systems. Von
Foerster (1960, 1982) based this undertaking on a model
of cognitive system that can be seen as a corrective of the
computationalist one. He called it a “biological computer,”
and assigned it the task of bringing into focus what the
digital computer model obscured. Living systems, unlike man-
made computers, are self-organizing systems, and develop
cognition not as abstract problem solving, but as the inherently
biological activity of surviving in an ever-changing “hostile”
environment.
The theoretical core of the biological computer model
can be found in a reworking of the McCulloch-Pitts thesis
(cognition = computation) that amplifies the 1947 revision
of cybernetics of networks. Von Foerster grounded this
reformulation in a principle of continuity between life
and cognition. Based on this principle, and on a literal
understanding of the Latin verb “computare” as “considering
things together,” he redefined computation as every operation
that a living system, as a self-organizing network of processes,
is able to perform to preserve itself (von Foerster, 1974).
It is a reconceptualization that transfers the notion of
computation from the epistemological space of abstract
problem solving to that of biological adaptation. Through this
notion, von Foerster designed a model that “biologizes”
the McCulloch-Pitts idea of computing networks, and
conveys strong versions of the immanence and reticularity
theses.
Von Foerster’s interpretation of computation requires
conceiving of the cognitive mind as immanent not only in brain
activity, but also in the other processes instantiating biological
self-organization. Along the lines sketched by McCulloch and
Pitts, it portrays mind not as “a ghost in the [biological] machine,”
but as the functioning biological machine itself. That is, not as
a substance, but as a process: a dynamic, distributed whole,
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whose functions are realized through computations performed
not only by neurons, but also by the other operative sub-units
distinguishable in biological networks.
Correlatively, “self-referentiality” is the logical structure that
von Foerster (1977) ascribed to biological computation. His idea
was that, given the organizational reticularity of living systems,
every computing operation that occurs in them is both the result
and the starting point of another computation. In other words,
all operations of a biological computer result in other operations
inside its network. This insight, which von Foerster (1977)
structured around Jean Piaget’s notion of “closure,” generated his
main epistemological thesis. The cognitive operations of a living
network do not refer to an external or transcendent reality. They
are instances of “Eigen-behavior”: operations that the network, as
an organized set of components, performs on itself.
This is the nucleus of von Foerster’s constructivist position,
which, based on previous analyses of his work (Ceruti, 1987,
1994, 2007; Damiano, 2009), we can summarize through three
theses contrasting with classical computationalism. (1) The
environment is not a reservoir of information for the biological
computer. It is an operationally independent source of energy and
matter to which the network must couple to fuel its processes.
(2) The biological computer, while thermodynamically open, is
informationally closed. Its circular organization precludes the
reception of exogenously defined information. It enables the
system to perceive some environmental events as perturbations,
and to react through self-regulation. (3) The biological computer
is a creator of information. By associating conservative Eigen-
behaviors with experienced perturbations, the systems loads
perceived environmental variations with operational meanings.
It treats these variations as though they were carrying
information on effective self-preserving behavior for those
conditions. Through its self-referential computation, it treats a
perturbing environment as a meaningful world – it constructs
a reality of reference for its interactions (von Foerster,
1979).
This constructivist reinterpretation of the McCulloch-Pitts
cybernetics of networks positions von Foerster among the
precursors of radical embodiment. His model of the biological
computer gives the cognizer’s body a much stronger role than
that postulated by McCulloch and Pitts. In von Foerster’s
work, the body is not simply the organic support for the
brain, understood as the only organ where cognitive processes
take place. Identification of living systems with computing
networks implies that the cognizer’s body is a “cognitive body”
(Montebelli et al., 2009) – a body that, in its integrality,
instantiates cognitive processes. From this perspective all mental
functions – consciousness included – appear grounded in the self-
referential computation of the cognizer’s body, and participating
both in her self-organization and in the organization of her
world.
This variant of experimental epistemology had significant
impact on the rise of radical embodiment. Starting in the late
1950s, it began converging in BCL’s groundbreaking work on
artificial self-organizing systems that, like Gordon Pask’s work,
has been inspiring radically embodied approaches in AI since
the 1990s (e.g., Cariani, 1993; Bird et al., 2003). Moreover, in the
late 1960s, von Foerster’s framework began to be elaborated upon
by other strands of experimental epistemology, which pioneered
radical embodiment.
THE COGNITIVE BIOLOGY OF
NETWORKS
Autopoiesis: Metabolic Networks as
Cognitive Systems
When considering the future of experimental epistemology in
the 1960s, McCulloch (1961b) recognized as continuators of this
research tradition the members of the team that had done, under
his supervision, the neurophysiological study on frog vision
resulting in the article “What the Frog’s Eye Tells the Frog’s
Brain” (Lettvin et al., 1953). They included the neurobiologist
Humberto Maturana, who, years later, paid homage to this
legacy by using the notion of experimental epistemology to
define his work in cognitive biology (Maturana, 1974). Its main
result, developed by Maturana with his former student Francisco
Varela, was the theory of autopoiesis, often included among the
theoretical sources of radical embodiment (Clark, 1997; Di Paolo
and Thompson, 2014; Ziemke, 2016).
The scientific program that Maturana and Varela (1980,
1987/1998) assigned to autopoiesis was that of addressing, in
conjunction, two fundamental questions – “What is life?” and
“What is cognition?” Their undertaking was based on the
thesis of continuity between life and cognition, and, like von
Foerster’s, it placed the emphasis on the autonomy of living
systems. Their notion of autopoiesis (namely: self-production)
postulated biological autonomy and defined it as the distinctive
capability of biological systems to produce and maintain their
material identity – themselves – through the production of
their components. Based on this notion, Maturana and Varela
formulated the above-mentioned principle as an equation: a
(life = cognition) hypothesis that characterizes its terms as
instantiations of the process of autopoiesis – metabolic self-
production.
Using this framework as a reference, Maturana and Varela
saw the possibility of providing a scientific definition of life
and cognition. Their idea was to create a “synthetic” definition,
based on a theoretical implementation of the synthetic method
(Damiano, 2009; Damiano and Stano, 2018a,b). Concretely,
this meant using biological insights to define an organizational
mechanism able to generate the minimal form of autopoiesis
(i.e., cellular autopoiesis), and then conceptually testing this
mechanism’s capability to produce known living and cognitive
phenomenology.
Maturana and Varela packaged this synthetic definition
in the notion of “autopoietic organization,” which describes
the cell’s autopoietic organization by drawing on the
McCulloch-Pitts descriptive schema – the model of a
network of operations realized by a population of interacting
components.
[The autopoietic organization is] a network of processes of
production (transformation and destruction) of components that
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produces the components which: (i) through their interactions
and transformations continuously regenerate and realize the
network of processes (relations) that produced them; and (ii)
constitute it (the machine) as a concrete unity in the space in
which they (the components) exist by specifying the topological
domain of its realization as such a network [. . .] (Maturana and
Varela, 1980, p. 79).
This definition, meant to characterize minimal living and
cognitive organization, resulted in a further “biologization” of
the McCulloch-Pitts cybernetics of networks. Through the notion
of autopoietic organization, Maturana and Varela elaborated
on von Foerster’s identification of living networks as cognitive
networks, but dropped his qualification of them as computing
networks – biological computers. The description of the
autopoietic processes in terms of transformation operations,
with no reference to computation, was a complete rejection of
the metaphor of the computer, which could still be found –
although residually – in von Foerster’s work. This dismissal
makes the theory of autopoiesis more than a correction of
computationalism. It is a radical alternative, proposing to model
basic cognitive organization not on a computer, but on a
metabolic network instantiating a minimal self-individuating
body.
One of the most interesting aspects of the notion of autopoietic
organization is that it succeeds in capturing a characteristic
trait of cellular dynamics: the fact that the system’s components
continually change, while the system itself, as a relational
unity of components, remains. This notion describes cellular
metabolism as a dynamic, reticular chain of operations of
elementary transformations that, by activating the synthesis or
destruction of its material components at every step, generates
a twofold effect. On one side, it produces changes in its
own materialization – i.e., in the autopoietic system’s material
structure. On the other side, it triggers the re-instantiation
of the functional relations that constitute it as a network
of operations and regenerate it. This is a thematization that
Maturana and Varela implemented through the complementarity
of “organization/structure,” grounding a new approach to
characterizing the mind/body relation.
The notion of autopoietic organization can be recognized
as sketching the preliminary lines of a theory of mind
that diverges radically from the classical view of an entity
essentially independent from its materialization. What Maturana
and Varela described through this notion is a cognitive
organization that constantly generates the process of its material
realization, and is constantly regenerated by it. From this
perspective, mind, as a cognitive organization, and body, as
its physical realization, cannot be considered as two different
substances, independent of each other. They appear as two
inseparable aspects of the same process – biological self-
production.
This is a reworking of the McCulloch-Pitts point of view. Mind
is a process, not a substance. It is a dynamic, collective whole
distributed, first and foremost, across the metabolic operations
producing the biological body. Mind is not the “ghost in the
[biological] machine,” but the dynamic biological machine itself –
which, for Maturana and Varela, could not be described as a
computer.
Autopoietic machines do not have inputs or outputs. They can be
perturbed by independent events and undergo internal structural
changes which compensate these perturbations. (Ibid.:81)
Through their expansion of the McCulloch-Pitts theses of
reticularity and immanence, Maturana and Varela developed
a constructivist view convergent with von Foerster’s in
recognizing the self-referentiality of biological cognition
and the related inaccessibility of an “absolute reality.”
They structured this view around the notion of “structural
coupling,” which inter-relates the autopoietic system and
its environment in a dynamics of reciprocal perturbations
and self-determined regulations. This notion defines the
continuance of the system-environment coupling as the
condition for maintaining autopoiesis, and assigns biological
cognition the task of meeting this condition. This relies
on self-regulatory activity through which the autopoietic
system, as it produces itself interacting with its environment,
“brings forth a world.” That is, it loads perturbing events
with operational meanings supporting its effective action in
its domain of existence (Maturana and Varela, 1987/1998,
p. 26).
In their work together, Maturana and Varela argued strongly
for the capability of their theory to synthetically explain human
cognitive phenomenology, but they did not model human
cognition. A synthetic approach to modeling it was developed by
Varela independently.
Autonomy: Networks as Emergent
Selves
In the late 1970s, Varela started an individual research
path, parallel to the one with Maturana and explicitly
developed as a strand of experimental epistemology (Varela,
1986).
One of Varela’s priorities was to extend the organizational
modeling of cognitive systems that autopoiesis began at the
cellular level. His aim was to create a model able to bring
into research focus, at all relevant levels of description, the
relationship between autonomy and cognition – between self-
constitution of a cognitive system and constitution of its world
of reference. To this end, Varela engaged in synthetic modeling
of the organization shared by all autonomous systems. The
resulting notion, introduced in Principles of Biological Autonomy
(1979) as “organizational closure,” relaunched the cognitive
network schema in a variant that hybridized its previous
versions – McCulloch and Pitts’, von Foerster’s, and the autopoetic
one. Varela combined them with the goal of dismissing both
the cybernetic concept of computation and the autopoietic
reference to the (minimal) biological level. What he articulated
is a general formulation of the Piagetian concept of closure,
through which he intended to capture the general form of
the circularity that experimental epistemology had progressively
recognized as the basic organizational trait of autonomous
systems.
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[. . .] Autonomous systems are organizationally closed, that is,
their organization is characterized by processes such that (1)
the processes are related into a network, so that they depend
recursively on each other in the generation and implementation
of the processes themselves; and (2) constitute the system as a
recognizable unit in the space (domain) in which the process
exists. [...] The processes that specify a closed organization can be
of any type and take place in any space defined by the properties of
the components that constitute the process. (Varela, 1979, p. 55)
Based on this new notion of network, Varela’s model could
be used to characterize as autonomous systems all structures
generated by interdependence between processes. It could
synthetically define as systems endowed with a certain degree of
autonomy all units that, deriving from reticular co-dependence,
do not work as computing input-output devices, but generate
operational meanings for perturbations.
[...] For such systems all the apparent informational exchanges
with the environment will, and can only be, treated as
perturbations within the process that defines their closure [...].
(Ibid.:59)
In his writings, Varela (1991, 1995b) gave this model two
working definitions. The first, “selfless self,” emphasizes the
divergence of Varela’s “cognitive self ” from the classical notion
of subject. This definition reframes the autopoietic thesis
according to which the subject of cognitive processes goes
beyond the Cartesian alternative between two substances –
an immaterial cognitive organization and a material aggregate.
The “selfless self ” is not a substance. It emerges from
the dynamic entanglement between (immaterial) organization
and the (material) structure of autonomous systems. It is
distributed across the continuous process through which
components are dynamically organized in a whole, and this
whole conservatively interacts, as a coherent unit, with its
environment by regulating the behavior of its components.
This view is stressed in the 1995 definition of “emergent self,”
which refers to the capability of elementary co-dependence
to produce a level of organization qualitatively different from
that of its constituents. It outlines a cognitive system that,
as an integrative unit formed by reticular connections among
elementary operations, is inherently open to developing higher-
level reticular connections, allowing it to participate in higher-
level cognitive units.
This theoretical construction further extends the McCulloch-
Pitts view of mind. According to Varela’s model, mind is
a plural process. It is a collective entity that is distributed
among the interactions between different organizational levels of
autonomous systems, and can participate in creating new levels.
It is an intrinsically polycentric, metamorphic entity, which, if
we interpret Varela’s theory of autonomy literally, is immanent
not only in biological self-production, but also in other forms of
autonomous systems’ self-constitution – that is, in the plurality of
organizational closures and related forms of cohesion that science
can individuate at its different levels of inquiry. In fact, from
1979 on, Varela’s definitions of the cognitive self did not include
inherent references to the biological domain.
An underlying circular process elicits an emerging coherence and
this is the cognitive self at that level. (Varela, 1995b, p. 193)
This variant of the idea of cognitive network can be recognized
as the basic descriptive tool through which Varela developed his
radical embodiment theory – enaction.2
THE COGNITIVE SCIENCE OF
NETWORKS
Radicalizing McCulloch’s “Embodiments
of Mind”
One of the most advanced versions of Varela’s enactive theory
of mind can be found in his 2001 article with Evan Thompson
(Thompson and Varela, 2001). This work, entitled Radical
Embodiment, makes it evident that the Thompson-Varela attempt
to overcome dualism does not rely on the “neuro-anatomical
solution” typical of mainstream embodied cognitive science.
Thompson and Varela developed a “neuro-dynamic solution,”
which locates the mind not in the cerebral platform, but
in the processes defining the nervous system’s participation
in human cognition. In their article, they described these
dynamics as “cycles of operations” generating the three forms
of co-evolution supporting human cognition: the couplings
between, respectively, nervous system and body, organism and
environment, and agent and other agents.
Through the first of these processes, Thompson and Varela
grounded the embodied mind in the cyclical operations through
which the nervous system regulates the complex dynamics of the
human organism’s self-production. Building on Varela’s previous
works, Radical Embodiment characterizes the human body as a
set of closed networks interconnected with each other and with
the nervous system. The Varelian model of the emergent self can
be recognized in action. It can be seen as the key to interpreting
all the networks constituting the human body as enmeshed
autonomous systems. From the 1990s on, Varela conceptualized
them as co-evolving “cognitive selves” recognizable in “cells,
tissues, organs [...]”, and in the “bio-mechanical networks, bio-
chemical networks, physiological networks [...]” of the human
body. Drawing on Paul Weiss and Gregory Bateson’s idea of
ecologies of mind, Varela (1991) thought of these somatic
networks as “a meshwork of selfless selves” coupled with the
nervous system.
This is a reworking of the autopoietic characterization of the
body as a cognitive network (of networks), on the basis of which
Varelian enaction deepens McCulloch’s idea of “embodiments
of mind.” It pushes experimental epistemology to move from
McCulloch’s “mind is in the head” thesis to a view that, in line
with autopoiesis, locates mind “not in the head” (Varela, 1999),
but, first and foremost, among the rhythms and patterns of
human body self-production.
2According to current mappings (e.g., Di Paolo and Thompson, 2014), radical
embodiment approaches include Francisco Varela’s enaction and its developments
based on Varela’s collaboration with Evan Thompson (Varela et al., 1991;
Thompson and Varela, 2001).
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Thompson and Varela (2001) further redefined McCulloch’s
location of mind based on the description of the dynamics
through which the nervous system couples the human organism
and the environment. They characterized it as “sensorimotor
coupling,” reframing the constructivist modeling of the nervous
system in terms of a closed network that interconnects sensorium
and motorium, and maintains their coordination via self-
regulation. This is the framework, introduced by pioneers of
constructivism such as Piaget and von Foerster, which rejects
the traditional hypothesis of a representational phase between
perception and action. The description of the nervous system
in terms of the sensorimotor closure of the human organism
replaces traditional representations by neuronal patterns of self-
regulation, that is, patterns of neuronal activity that associate
sensorial perturbations with actions favoring the organism’s
stability. It is an option that supports the constructivist
view of human cognition according to which the objects
we deal with cognitively, far from being predefined external
entities that we represent internally, are “tokens of Eigen-
behaviors” (von Foerster, 1977). In the 1990s, Varela and
Thompson, with Eleanor Rosch, conveyed this perspective in
the notion of enaction as “embodied action” that “brings
forth a world.” In short, the neuronal network associates
sensorial perturbations with patterns of self-regulation that
project, on the perceived aspects of the environment, objects
expressing the cognizer’s “readiness for action” – her contextual
possibilities of action, defined by her body structure (Varela et al.,
1991).
This perspective radicalizes Varela’s (1999) “mind is not in the
head” thesis. According to this view, mind, far from being located
in the intra-individual space, is immanent in the co-specification
dynamics that correlates somatic networks, the neuronal network
and the environment. Its place is the coupling that links not
only brain and body, but also organism and environment, and,
thus, the cognizer and other agents. As the proponents of
experimental epistemology saw, mind is a process. Yet, it is not
a process confined to the brain or the body. Being immanent in
neuronal activity, mind is distributed in the interaction through
which brain, body and environment interdependently define
their patterns of activity. It is by interconnecting brain, body and
environment – other agents included – in a continual process
of co-transformation that mind instantiates human cognitive
processes.
Neuronal Networks and Self
This view of mind as dynamic interconnection of brain,
body and environment is reflected in Varela’s studies on
neural correlates of consciousness. In the 1970s, Varela began
working on characterizing the neuronal ensembles supporting
the agent’s sensorimotor coupling in terms of self-organizing
behaviors. The key idea was that of a quick, flexible, functional
coordination between distant areas of the brain (i.e., large-scale
“neuronal integration”) mediated by resonances among neuronal
oscillations – a “synchronization” of their phase of oscillation
connecting neurons in temporary coherent collective units
(Varela et al., 2001). Varela described these functional units as
neuronal assemblies that “interpret” the organism-environment
coupling, and, on this basis, orient its future (Varela, 1995a).
This is another application of his model of the network, which
characterizes the processes of neuronal integration as dynamics
generating transitory autonomous systems – organizational
closures that instantiate emergent selves on the micro-temporal
scale (Damiano, 2009).
Varela developed this view explicitly in the 1990s, defining
neuronal ensembles as “micro-identities”: transient selves
expressing readiness for action – contextual possibilities of
action grounded in the agent’s body. Their instantiation,
through neuronal integration, determines the specific way
in which, at a certain moment, the cognizer brings forth her
world. When a micro-identity is self-constituted, via a process
of self-organization triggered by exogenous or endogenous
perturbations, a related “micro-world” arises at the level
of subjective experience. The agent is immersed in a new
situation, defined by the readiness for action that her temporary
micro-identity supports.
You put your hand into your pocket [...]. Breakdown: you stop,
your thoughts are muddled, your emotional tonality shifts. [...] A
new world emerges: you see clearly that you left your wallet in the
store where you just bought cigarettes. Your mood shifts now to
one of concern [...], your readiness for action is now to quickly go
back to the store [...].3 (Varela, 1992, p. 11)
This can be seen as an innovative variant of McCulloch and
Pitts’ modeling of neuronal activity, used by Varela to propose
a radical alternative to their original idea of consciousness as
an objective, “from nowhere” representation of the system-
environment relation. Varela’s characterization of neuronal
activity reframes the McCulloch-Pitts descriptive pattern of
the network, and thereby grounds, in neuronal dynamics, a
highly situated, perspective-based form of conscious experience.
Indeed, what Varela defined, through the hypothesis of a
punctuated succession of micro-identities and micro-worlds, was
an intrinsically situated conscious agent whose point of view is
continually reconfigured by variations in situational context and
attentional focus.
Based on experimental insights, this radically embodied
approach to conscious experience was reproposed in the 2001
Thompson-Varela article. It was a rigorous reframing, with
the ambition of giving the self a new status, beyond the
alternative between by-product of brain activity and substantial
subject of experience. In line with the general methodological
positioning of experimental epistemology, Thompson and Varela
portrayed the self as a legitimate, non-epiphenomenal object
of empirical and quantitative inquiry, synthetically explainable
in terms of mechanisms – the mechanisms of neuronal
integration. It is on this basis that, converging with the non-
substantialist approach inherited from its tradition, Varelian
enaction challenges the Cartesian image of the self. It proposes to
conceptualize the self no longer as a permanent, consistent center
of conscious experience, but as a process – notably, a contingent,
discontinuous, highly distributed process.
3The translation is ours.
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The contingency of the enactive self is upheld in its
theoretical characterization, which correlates it with non-
linear self-organization dynamics that reflect structural and
historical specificities of the plural coupling of the nervous
system. Discontinuity is inherent to this process, which
structures and de-structures neuronal ensembles – that is,
transitory readiness for action defining the (micro-)identities
of the self – in reaction to breakdowns that punctuate the
interactions of the nervous system within its twofold ecology –
organism and environment. The distributed character of the
self stems from this co-evolution, which establishes a radical
interdependence between the changes in the self ’s identity and
the modifications intervening in the patterns of activity of
the somatic networks, environment and agents with which the
cognizer interacts.
From this perspective, the self of conscious experience
appears as an event – a brain-body-environment-others event.
Correlatively, consciousness, as a process arising in the complex
of the radically embodied mind, appears to cut across the
traditional partitions of cognitive science, thereby bringing into
question not only its classical notions and theses, but also the
standard individuation of its relevant research objects.
This view influenced recent frontier research on mind and
consciousness, such as the pattern theory of self (Gallagher,
2013), neuro-scientific characterizations of self-related processes
(Antonova and Nehaniv, 2018), and the self-organizational
theory of machine consciousness (Tani, 2017). By developing the
framework of Varela’s enaction, these works still draw on the lines
of McCullochian experimental epistemology, and implicitly grant
to this research tradition further impact on the advancement of
scientific exploration of mind and consciousness.
THE HERITAGE OF EXPERIMENTAL
EPISTEMOLOGY
One of the most interesting aspects of experimental epistemology
is the variety of its scientific production, spanning from classic
computationalist to radical embodiment stances (Figure 1).
This diversity, as we have shown, is crosscut by significant
convergences in research approaches. They rely on common
theoretical and methodological axes of development, along
which the strands of this tradition have articulated their
respective contributions to the shared objective of deepening the
scientific understanding of “embodiments of mind.” Indeed, the
evolution of experimental epistemology, from McCulloch-Pitts
computational cybernetics to Varelian enaction, can be read as
the ongoing elaboration of a research strategy able to tackle, in a
FIGURE 1 | The genealogy of McCulloch and Pitts’ cybernetics of networks.
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scientific manner, a classical epistemological issue – namely, how
the body is involved in mental processes.
Today this issue is still open, and appears far from being
solved. As is clear from the literature, three decades after the
establishment of the new “body-centered” cognitive science and
AI, there is still no consensus on how to interpret its main thesis,
according to which the body is crucial to cognition (Di Paolo and
Thompson, 2014). Moreover, many of the dissonant formulations
of this thesis are currently recognized as local, ad hoc redefinitions
of computationalist dualism, which portray the biological body
as a “a physical container” whose role is to allow the classical
“computational mind to interact with its environment through
sensors and actuators” (Ziemke, 2016). Therefore a growing
number of contemporary specialists question the innovativeness
of the “embodiment turn” in cognitive science and AI, and
consider it more as an adjustment of computationalism than
the rise of a novel paradigm (e.g., Shapiro, 2007; Wheeler, 2014;
Ziemke, 2016). In this sense, it appears that one of the main
requirements that the embodied approach to cognitive science
and AI has to meet, to fully establish itself as an alternative, is
to develop non-computationalist (non-dualist) accounts for the
role(s) of the body for cognition.
Agreeing with these analyses, we think that experimental
epistemology can further contribute to the advancement of
cognitive science and AI specifically with regard to this issue.
We convey this tradition’s heritage for future research on the
embodied mind in three guidelines proposing an alternative to
the computationalist approach, and its contemporary variants, to
investigating and characterizing the role(s) played by the body in
cognitive processes.
(1) Recognizing the Whole Body as a
Cognitive System
The body’s organization, describable as a network (of networks)
of processes of transformation of components, instantiates the
organism as an inherently cognitive system, which, while
producing itself, conservatively modulates its coupling
with the environment, and thereby expresses cognition
as effective operativeness in its domain of existence. This
perspective dismisses computationalist dualism by fully
identifying the biological body’s organization as a cognitive
organization, and characterizing it as a network of operations
entangled with, and thus inseparable from, its material
realization.
(2) Exploring All Cognitive Functions –
Consciousness Included – As Inherently
Dependent on the Body, and Reflecting
Its Organizational Circularity
There are two main implications flowing from characterizing
the body’s organization as a cognitive organization grounding
all cognitive functions. The first is the indispensability of
the body, flesh and blood, for the expression of cognitive
functions, included high-level ones. The second is the
self-referentiality of biological cognition, which, due to
the reticular organization of the body and its constitutive
networks, is made of operations that refer not to an external
or transcendent reality, but to other cognitive operations.
What they instantiate is self-regulation “Eigen-behaviors,”
which generate operational meanings for perturbing
events – “bring forth” a meaningful cognizer-relative
world.
(3) Synthetically Investigating How a
Network of Processes of Transformation
of Components Can Instantiate
Continuity Between Matter, Life and
Cognition
Today embodied AI concentrates mainly on the biological
body’s structure, and explores how certain cognitive tasks
can be accomplished through interactions between body and
environment without requiring (or reducing the involvement
of) high-level cognitive processes. This work, as it produces
hardware that performs cognitive tasks, can be seen as a
first, significant step toward overcoming the computationalist
hardware/software dichotomy (Pfeifer and Scheier, 1999). Yet,
to fully model the role(s) of the biological body in cognition,
and overcome the classical body/mind dichotomy, embodied
AI has to take a further step. It has to focus on the
biological body’s organization through synthetic modeling of
how its reticular dynamics, while generating a self-producing
unit of components, instantiates its cognitive coupling with
the environment. As argued in (Damiano and Stano, 2018b),
this research topic, which AI specialists approach rarely and
mainly theoretically, could be developed experimentally, in
particular through cross-fertilization between embodied AI and
synthetic biology based on chemical Boolean networks. Although
a full “wetware modeling” of the biological body’s organization,
through this kind of network, currently appears out of reach, any
intermediate model would deepen the synthetic understanding
of embodied cognition, and could lead to the creation of new
forms of (minimal) cognitive bodies, different from the biological
archetypes.
The development of the tradition of experimental
epistemology suggests these guidelines should be implemented
through an inherently plural approach, based not on the mutual
exclusion, but on the coordination of different disciplines and
methods, and even the co-evolution of alternative (reciprocally
perturbing) research paradigms, as a strategy to multiply access to
the embodied mind. This might be one of the messages conveyed
in the plural form of the McCullochian label “embodiments of
mind.”
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